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(a) Before September 10 of any year in which the employer and a certified representative bargain collectively, they shall choose an impasse neutral either by agreement or through the processes of the American Arbitration Association. The impasse neutral shall be required to be available during the period from January 20 to February 1. Fees, costs and expenses of the impasse neutral shall be shared equally by the employer and the certified representative.
(b) (1) During the course of collective bargaining, either party may declare an impasse and request the services of the impasse neutral. If the parties have not reached agreement by January 20, an impasse exists.
(2) Whenever an impasse has been reached, the dispute shall be submitted to the impasse neutral. The impasse neutral shall attempt mediation by bringing the parties together voluntarily under such favorable auspices as will tend to effectuate the settlement of the dispute.
(3) If the impasse neutral, in the impasse neutral’s sole discretion, finds that the parties are at a bona fide impasse, the impasse neutral must require each party to submit a final offer which must consist either of a complete draft of a proposed collective bargaining agreement or a complete package proposal, as the impasse neutral chooses. If only complete package proposals are required, the impasse neutral must require the parties to submit jointly a memorandum of all items previously agreed upon.
(4) The impasse neutral may, in the impasse neutral’s discretion, require the parties to submit evidence or make oral or written argument in support of their proposals. The impasse neutral may hold a hearing for this purpose at a time, date and place selected by the impasse neutral. Said hearing must not be open to the public.
(5) On or before February 1, the impasse neutral must select, as a whole, the more reasonable, in the impasse neutral’s judgment, of the final offers submitted by the parties.
(A) The impasse neutral must first evaluate and give the highest priority to the ability of the County to pay for additional short-term and long-term expenditures by considering:
(i) the limits on the County’s ability to raise taxes under State law and the County Charter;
(ii) the added burden on County taxpayers, if any, resulting from increases in revenues needed to fund a final offer; and
(iii) the County’s ability to continue to provide the current standard of all public services.
(B) After evaluating the ability of the County to pay under subparagraph (A), the impasse neutral may only consider:
(i) the interest and welfare of County taxpayers and service recipients;
(ii) past collective bargaining contracts between the parties, including the bargaining history that led to each contract;
(iii) a comparison of wages, hours, benefits, and conditions of employment of similar employees of other public employers in the Washington Metropolitan Area and in Maryland;
(iv) a comparison of wages, hours, benefits, and conditions of employment of other Montgomery County employees; and
(v) wages, benefits, hours and other working conditions of similar employees of private employers in Montgomery County
(6) The impasse neutral must:
(A) not compromise or alter the final offer that he or she selects;
(B) select an offer based on the contents of that offer;
(C) not consider or receive any evidence or argument concerning the history of collective bargaining in this immediate dispute, including offers of settlement not contained in the offers submitted to the impasse neutral; and
(D) consider all previously agreed on items integrated with the specific disputed items to determine the single most reasonable offer.
(7) The offer selected by the impasse neutral, integrated with the previously agreed upon items, shall be deemed to represent the final agreement between the employer and the certified representative, without the necessity of ratification by the parties, and shall have the force and effect of a contract voluntarily entered into and ratified as set forth in subsection 33-80(g) above. The parties shall execute such agreement.
(c) An impasse over a reopener matter must be resolved under the procedures in this subsection. Any other impasse over a matter subject to collective bargaining must be resolved under the impasse procedure in subsections (a) and (b).
(1) If the parties agree in a collective bargaining agreement to bargain over an identified issue on or before a specified date, the parties must bargain under those terms. Each identified issue must be designated as a “reopener matter.”
(2) When the parties initiate collective bargaining under paragraph (1), the parties must choose, by agreement or through the processes of the American Arbitration Association, an impasse neutral who agrees to be available for impasse resolution within 30 days.
(3) If, after bargaining in good faith, the parties are unable to reach agreement on a reopener matter by the deadline specified in the collective bargaining agreement, either party may declare an impasse.
(4) If an impasse is declared under paragraph (3), the dispute must be submitted to the impasse neutral no later than 10 days after impasse is declared.
(5) The impasse neutral must resolve the dispute under the impasse procedure in subsection (b), except that:
(A) the dates in that subsection do not apply;
(B) each party must submit to the impasse neutral a final offer on only the reopener matter; and
(C) the impasse neutral must select the most reasonable of the parties’ final offers no later than 10 days after the impasse neutral receives the final offers.
(6) This subsection applies only if the parties in their collective bargaining agreement have designated:
(A) the specific reopener matter to be bargained;
(B) the date by which bargaining on the reopener matter must begin; and
(C) the deadline by which bargaining on the reopener matter must be completed and after which the impasse procedure must be implemented. (1982 L.M.C., ch. 53, § 3; 2003 L.M.C., ch. 22, § 1; 2004 L.M.C., ch. 15, § 1; 2010 L.M.C., ch. 57, § 1; 2011 L.M.C., ch. 16, § 1.)
Editor’s note—Sections 33-75, 33-76, 33-80, and 33-81 are cited, and Sections 33-80(h) and 33-84(a) are quoted, in Fraternal Order of Police, Montgomery County Lodge 35, Inc., v. Montgomery County, 212 Md. App. 230, 66 A.3d 1183 (2013), affirmed, 437 Md. 618, 89 A.3d 1093 (2014).
Sections 33-75 through 33-85 and Sections 33-101 through 33-112 are cited, and Section 33-80 is quoted, in Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 35 v. Montgomery County, 436 Md. 1, 80 A.3d 686 (2013).
Sections 33-81 and 33-83 are cited and quoted, and Sections 33-75, 33-76, 33-77, 33-78, 33-79, 33-80, 33-82, 33-84 & 33-85 are cited in Fraternal Order of Police, Montgomery County Lodge 35, Inc., v. Montgomery County Executive, 210 Md. App. 117, 62 A.3d 238 (2013). The Court interpreted Section 33-80 regarding collective bargaining agreements and the funding of future County budgets.
2011 L.M.C., ch. 16, was petitioned to referendum and was approved by a majority of the registered voters on November 6, 2012.
(a) The employer or its agents or representatives are prohibited from:
(1) Interfering with, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of any rights granted to them under the provisions of this article;
(2) Dominating or interfering with the formation or administration of any employee organization or contributing financial or other support to it, pursuant to contract or otherwise; provided that the employer and a certified representative may agree to and apply a membership dues deduction provision as provided herein and to reasonable use of county facilities for communicating with employees;
(3) Encouraging or discouraging membership in any employee organization by discrimination in regard to hiring, tenure, wages, hours or conditions of employment, provided that nothing in this article shall preclude an agreement from containing a provision for an agency shop;
(4) Discharging or discriminating against a public employee because he has filed charges, given testimony or otherwise lawfully aided in the administration of this article;
(5) Refusing to bargain collectively with a certified representative;
(6) Refusing to reduce to writing or refusing to sign a bargaining agreement which has been agreed to in all respects;
(7) Refusing to process or arbitrate a grievance if required under a grievance procedure contained in a collective bargaining agreement;
(8) Directly or indirectly opposing the appropriation of funds or the enactment of legislation by the county council to implement an agreement reached between the employer and the certified representative pursuant to this article;
(9) Engaging in a lockout of employees;
(b) Employee organizations, and their agents, representatives and employees, are prohibited from:
(1) Interfering with, restraining or coercing the employer or employees in the exercise of any rights granted under this article;
(2) Restraining, coercing or interfering with the employer in the selection of its representatives for the purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances;
(3) Refusing to bargain collectively with the employer if such employee organization is the certified representative.
(4) Refusing to reduce to writing or refusing to sign a bargaining agreement which has been agreed to in all respects;
(5) Hindering or preventing, by threats of violence, intimidation, force or coercion of any kind, the pursuit of any lawful work or employment by any person, public or private, or obstructing or otherwise unlawfully interfering with the entrance to or egress from any place of employment, or obstructing or unlawfully interfering with the free and uninterrupted use of public roads, streets, highways, railways, airports or other ways of travel or conveyance by any person, public or private;
(6) Hindering or preventing by threats, intimidation, force, coercion or sabotage, the obtaining, use or disposition of materials, supplies, equipment or services by the employer;
(7) Taking or retaining unauthorized possession of property of the employer or refusing to do work or use certain goods or materials as lawfully required by the employer;
(8) Forcing or requiring the employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular employee organization or classification rather than to employees in another employee organization or classification;
(9) Causing or attempting to cause the employer to pay or deliver or agree to pay or deliver any money or other thing of value, in the nature of an exaction, for services which are neither performed or to be performed.
(c) A charge of prohibited practice may be filed by the employer, employee organization, or any individual employee. The charge or charges shall be filed with the permanent umpire, with copies to the party alleged to have committed a prohibited practice. All charges shall contain a statement of facts sufficient to enable the permanent umpire to investigate the charge. The permanent umpire may request withdrawal of and, if necessary, summarily dismiss charges if they are insufficiently supported in fact or in law to warrant a hearing. The permanent umpire shall have authority to maintain such independent investigation as the permanent umpire determines necessary and to develop rules and regulations therefor. If, upon investigation, the permanent umpire finds that a charge is sufficiently supported to raise an issue of fact or law, the permanent umpire shall hold a hearing on such charge upon notification to the parties. In any hearing, charging parties shall present evidence in support of the charges and the party or parties charged shall have the right to file an answer to the charges, to appear in person or otherwise and to present evidence in defense of the charges.
(d) If the permanent umpire determines that the person charged has committed a prohibited practice, the permanent umpire shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law and shall be empowered to issue an order requiring the person charged to cease and desist from the prohibited practice and to take such affirmative action as will remedy the violation(s) of this article. Remedies of the permanent umpire may include, but shall not be limited to, reinstating employees with or without back pay, making employees whole for any loss relating to county employment suffered as a result of any prohibited practice, withdrawing or suspending the employee organization's authority to negotiate or continue membership dues deductions, or agency shop benefits. If the permanent umpire finds that the party or parties charged have not committed any prohibited practices, the permanent umpire shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law and issue an order dismissing the charges.
(e) The permanent umpire shall not receive or entertain charges based upon an alleged prohibited practice occurring more than six (6) months prior to the filing of the charge. (1982 L.M.C., ch. 53, § 3; 2004 L.M.C., ch. 15, § 1.)
Editor’s note—Sections 33-75 through 33-85 and Sections 33-101 through 33-112 are cited, and Section 33-80 is quoted, in Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 35 v. Montgomery County, 436 Md. 1, 80 A.3d 686 (2013).
Sections 33-81 and 33-83 are cited and quoted, and Sections 33-75, 33-76, 33-77, 33-78, 33-79, 33-80, 33-82, 33-84 & 33-85 are cited in Fraternal Order of Police, Montgomery County Lodge 35, Inc., v. Montgomery County Executive, 210 Md. App. 117, 62 A.3d 238 (2013). The Court interpreted Section 33-80 regarding collective bargaining agreements and the funding of future County budgets.
See County Attorney Opinion dated 9/26/11 regarding a union’s authority to engage in collective bargaining on behalf of current employees, but not on behalf of future employees. See County Attorney Opinion dated 9/2/03 analyzing that, although permitted under personnel and collective bargaining principles, a grant program to cover closing costs for public safety employees would be taxable income to the employees receiving the benefit.
The expression of any views, argument or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether orally, in writing or otherwise, shall not constitute or be evidence of a prohibited practice under any of the provisions of this law nor be grounds for invalidating any election conducted under this law if such expression or dissemination contains no threat of reprisal or promise of benefit. (1982 L.M.C., ch. 53, § 3.)
Editor’s note—Sections 33-75 through 33-85 and Sections 33-101 through 33-112 are cited, and Section 33-80 is quoted, in Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 35 v. Montgomery County, 436 Md. 1, 80 A.3d 686 (2013).
Sections 33-81 and 33-83 are cited and quoted, and Sections 33-75, 33-76, 33-77, 33-78, 33-79, 33-80, 33-82, 33-84 & 33-85 are cited in Fraternal Order of Police, Montgomery County Lodge 35, Inc., v. Montgomery County Executive, 210 Md. App. 117, 62 A.3d 238 (2013). The Court interpreted Section 33-80 regarding collective bargaining agreements and the funding of future County budgets.
(a) No employee or employee organization shall either directly or indirectly cause, instigate, encourage, condone or engage in any strike, nor the employer in any lockout. No employee or employee organization shall obstruct, impede or restrict, either directly or indirectly, any attempt to terminate a strike.
(b) The employer shall not pay, reimburse, make whole or otherwise compensate any employee for or during the period when said employee is directly or indirectly engaged in a strike, nor shall the employer thereafter compensate an employee who struck for wages or benefits lost during such strike.
(c) If an employee or employee organization violates this section, the employer, after adequate notice and a fair hearing before the permanent umpire who finds that the alleged violations have occurred and that any or all of the following actions are necessary in the public interest, may, subject to the law enforcement officer’s bill of rights, Title 3, Subtitle 1 of the Public Safety Article of the Maryland Code:
(1) Impose disciplinary action, including dismissal from employment, on employees engaged in such conduct;
(2) Terminate or suspend employee organization’s dues deduction privilege, if any;
(3) Revoke the certification of and disqualify the employee organization from participation in representation elections for a period up to a maximum of two (2) years.
(d) Nothing contained herein shall prohibit an employer from seeking any remedy available in a court of competent jurisdiction. (1982 L.M.C., ch. 53, § 3; 2010 L.M.C., ch. 49, § 1.)
Editor’s note—Sections 33-75, 33-76, 33-80, and 33-81 are cited, and Sections 33-80(h) and 33-84(a) are quoted, in Fraternal Order of Police, Montgomery County Lodge 35, Inc., v. Montgomery County, 212 Md. App. 230, 66 A.3d 1183 (2013), affirmed, 437 Md. 618, 89 A.3d 1093 (2014).
Sections 33-75 through 33-85 and Sections 33-101 through 33-112 are cited, and Section 33-80 is quoted, in Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 35 v. Montgomery County, 436 Md. 1, 80 A.3d 686 (2013).
Sections 33-81 and 33-83 are cited and quoted, and Sections 33-75, 33-76, 33-77, 33-78, 33-79, 33-80, 33-82, 33-84 & 33-85 are cited in Fraternal Order of Police, Montgomery County Lodge 35, Inc., v. Montgomery County Executive, 210 Md. App. 117, 62 A.3d 238 (2013). The Court interpreted Section 33-80 regarding collective bargaining agreements and the funding of future County budgets.
Nothing contained in this article shall be construed to repeal any laws, executive orders, legislation, rules or regulations adopted by the county and any department or agency thereof not inconsistent with the provisions of this article. (1982 L.M.C., ch. 53, § 3.)
Editor’s note—Sections 33-75 through 33-85 and Sections 33-101 through 33-112 are cited, and Section 33-80 is quoted, in Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 35 v. Montgomery County, 436 Md. 1, 80 A.3d 686 (2013).
Sections 33-81 and 33-83 are cited and quoted, and Sections 33-75, 33-76, 33-77, 33-78, 33-79, 33-80, 33-82, 33-84 & 33-85 are cited in Fraternal Order of Police, Montgomery County Lodge 35, Inc., v. Montgomery County Executive, 210 Md. App. 117, 62 A.3d 238 (2013). The Court interpreted Section 33-80 regarding collective bargaining agreements and the funding of future County budgets.
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