Sec. 17. 

Every officer or employee who leaves, or has since January 1, 1940, left, his office or position to serve in the armed forces of the United States shall be entitled to leave of absence, hereinafter designated as “military leave,” subject to all of the terms and conditions contained in the general laws of the state applicable to municipal officers or employees serving in such armed forces; provided that if any person on military leave is dishonorably discharged from the armed forces his military leave shall ipso facto terminate. Every officer or employee returning from military leave to the service of the City in accordance with the applicable general laws of the state shall be entitled not only to restoration to his office or position but also to any office or position to which he may have been promoted during such military leave or to which he would be or would have been entitled under the provisions of Section 125 of this Charter in the event any change in personnel within the contemplation of said Charter section has occurred during the period of his military leave, it being the intent of this provision to provide for the re-employment of persons absent on account of military leave, without prejudice on account of their absence from the City service during the period of such leave; provided that any such person is not, upon such return, either physically or mentally incapacitated from performing the duties of the office or position to which he is entitled to be restored. All military leave herein provided for shall be without pay or compensation except to the extent that such pay or compensation is now or may hereafter be authorized and provided for by state law, this Charter, by ordinance, or by resolution of the board of any department having control of its own revenue and funds. No vacation rights or credits shall accrue during any period of military leave except to the extent that such rights or credits are now, or may hereafter be, authorized and provided for by state law, by this Charter, or by ordinance.  (Amended, 1951.)

In addition to retirement credit for the period of military leave up to noon of December 31, 1947, under the provisions of this section prior to this amendment, which credit is hereby continued in full force and effect, the period of any such military leave, subsequent to June 25, 1950, and up to but not extending beyond one year from the date upon which either the President or the Congress proclaims the end of the national emergency which the President proclaimed on December 16, 1950, shall be counted as part of the aggregate service required for retirement purposes under the provisions of Article XVII or Article XXXIV of this Charter; provided, however, that no period of military leave after June 25, 1955, shall be so counted. In the event the Congress should at any time declare war, the period of military leave commencing on the date of such declaration of war and extending up to but not beyond one year from the date of the cessation of hostilities of any such war, as fixed by Proclamation of the President or Resolution of the Congress, shall likewise be counted as part of the aggregate service required for retirement purposes under the provisions of said Article XVII or Article XXXIV.  (Added, 1951.)

Any officer or employee who, while on military leave is or becomes entitled to retire on pension or is or becomes entitled to any benefits under or pursuant to the provisions of Article XVII or Article XXXIV of this Charter, may exercise such rights or claim such benefits while on military leave.  (Amended, 1951.)

The provisions of Sec. 189 and of Subdivision (d) of Sec. 513 of this Charter are hereby repealed; provided, however that any officer or employee who, prior to the effective date of this amendment, was entitled to credit for retirement purposes under the provisions of either of said sections shall continue to be entitled to such credit.  (Added, 1951.)

Laws protecting the civil rights of public employees who enter the armed forces in time of war or emergency are favored and are to be liberally construed to effect such purpose.

Gibson v. City of San Diego, 25 Cal. (2d) 930, 935, 936.

Dierkes v. City of Los Angeles, 25 Cal. (2d) 938, 942.