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(a) (1) Except as provided in division (a)(2), (a)(3) or (a)(4) of this section or as otherwise provided in this section, a prosecution shall be barred unless it is commenced within the following periods after an offense is committed:
A. For a felony, six (6) years;
B. For a misdemeanor other than a minor misdemeanor, two (2) years; and
C. For a minor misdemeanor, six (6) months.
(2) There is no period of limitation for the prosecution of a violation of ORC 2903.01 or ORC 2903.02 or a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance.
(3) Except as otherwise provided in divisions (b) to (j) of this section, a prosecution of any of the following offenses shall be barred unless it is commenced within twenty (20) years after the offense is committed:
A. A violation of ORC 2903.03, 2903.04, 2905.01, 2905.32, 2907.04, 2907.05, 2907.21, 2909.02, 2909.22, 2909.23, 2909.24, 2909.26, 2909.27, 2909.28, 2909.29, 2911.01, 2911.02, 2911.11, 2911.12, or 2917.02 or substantially equivalent municipal ordinance; a violation of ORC 2903.11 or 2903.12, or substantially equivalent municipal ordinance, if the victim is a peace officer; or a violation of former ORC 2907.12 or equivalent municipal ordinance.
B. A conspiracy to commit, attempt to commit, or complicity in committing a violation set forth in division (a)(3)A. of this section.
(4) Except as otherwise provided in divisions (d) to (l) of this section, a prosecution of a violation of ORC 2907.02 or 2907.03 or a conspiracy to commit, attempt to commit, or complicity in committing a violation of either section, or substantially equivalent municipal ordinances, shall be barred unless it is commenced within twenty-five (25) years after the offense is committed.
(b) (1) Except as otherwise provided in division (b)(2) of this section, if the period of limitation provided in division (a)(1) or (a)(3) of this section has expired, prosecution shall be commenced for an offense of which an element is fraud or breach of fiduciary duty within one (1) year after discovery of the offense either by an aggrieved person or by the aggrieved person's legal representative who is not a party to the offense.
(2) If the period of limitation provided in division (a)(1) or (a)(3) of this section has expired, prosecution for a violation of ORC 2913.49 shall be commenced within five (5) years after discovery of the offense either by an aggrieved person or the aggrieved person's legal representative who is not a party to the offense.
(c) (1) If the period of limitation provided in division (a)(1) or (a)(3) of this section has expired, prosecution shall be commenced for the following offenses during the following specified periods of time:
A. For an offense involving misconduct in office by a public servant at any time while the accused remains a public servant, or within two (2) years thereafter;
B. For an offense by a person who is not a public servant but whose offense is directly related to the misconduct in office of a public servant, at any time while that public servant remains a public servant, or within two (2) years thereafter.
(2) As used in this division:
A. The phrase "offense is directly related to the misconduct in office of a public servant" includes, but is not limited to, a violation of ORC 101.71, 101.91, 121.61 or 2921.13, 102.03(F) or (H), 2921.02(A), 2921.43(A) or (B), or 3517.13(F) or (G), that is directly related to an offense involving misconduct in office of a public servant, or a violation of any municipal ordinance substantially equivalent to those ORC sections listed in this division (c)(2)A.
B. "Public servant" has the same meaning as in ORC 2921.01.
(d) (1) If a DNA record made in connection with the criminal investigation of the commission of a violation of ORC 2907.02 or 2907.03 or a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance is determined to match another DNA record that is of an identifiable person and if the time of the determination is later than twenty-five (25) years after the offense is committed, prosecution of that person for a violation of the section may be commenced within five (5) years after the determination is complete.
(2) If a DNA record made in connection with the criminal investigation of the commission of a violation of ORC 2907.02 or 2907.03 or a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance is determined to match another DNA record that is of an identifiable person and if the time of the determination is within twenty-five (25) years after the offense is committed, prosecution of that person for a violation of the section may be commenced within the longer of twenty-five (25) years after the offense is committed or five (5) years after the determination is complete.
(3) As used in this subsection, "DNA record" has the same meaning as in ORC 109.573.
(e) An offense is committed when every element of the offense occurs. In the case of an offense of which an element is a continuing course of conduct, the period of limitation does not begin to run until such course of conduct or the accused's accountability for it terminates, whichever occurs first.
(f) A prosecution is commenced on the date an indictment is returned or an information filed, or on the date a lawful arrest without a warrant is made, or on the date a warrant, summons, citation, or other process is issued, whichever occurs first. A prosecution is not commenced by the return of an indictment or the filing of an information unless reasonable diligence is exercised to issue and execute process on the same. A prosecution is not commenced upon issuance of a warrant, summons, citation, or other process unless reasonable diligence is exercised to execute the same.
(g) The period of limitation shall not run during any time when the corpus delicti remains undiscovered.
(h) The period of limitation shall not run during any time when the accused purposely avoids prosecution. Proof that the accused departed this City or conceals the accused's identity or whereabouts is prima facie evidence of the accused's purpose to avoid prosecution.
(i) The period of limitation shall not run during any time a prosecution against the accused based on the same conduct is pending in this State, even though the indictment, information, or process that commenced the prosecution is quashed or the proceedings on the indictment, information, or process are set aside or reversed on appeal.
(j) The period of limitation for a violation of this Part 6 - General Offenses Code or Title XXIX of the Ohio Revised Code that involves a physical or mental wound, injury, disability, or condition of a nature that reasonably indicates abuse or neglect of a child under eighteen (18) years of age or of a child with a developmental disability or physical impairment under twenty-one (21) years of age shall not begin to run until either of the following occurs:
(1) The victim of the offense reaches the age of majority.
(2) A public children services agency, or a municipal or county peace officer that is not the parent or guardian of the child, in the county in which the child resides or in which the abuse or neglect is occurring or has occurred has been notified that abuse or neglect is known, suspected, or believed to have occurred.
(k) As used in this section, "peace officer" has the same meaning as in ORC 2935.01.
(l) The amendments to divisions (a) and (d) of this section apply to a violation of ORC 2907.02 or 2907.03, or substantially equivalent municipal ordinance, committed on and after July 16, 2015 and apply to a violation of either of those sections committed prior to July 16, 2015 if prosecution for that violation was not barred under this section as it existed on July 15, 2015.
(ORC 2901.13)
(a) Except as provided in division (b) of this section, a person is not guilty of an offense unless both of the following apply:
(1) he person's liability is based on conduct that includes either a voluntary act, or an omission to perform an act or duty that the person is capable of performing; and
(2) The person has the requisite degree of culpability for each element as to which a culpable mental state is specified by the language defining the offense.
(b) When the language defining an offense does not specify any degree of culpability, and plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict criminal liability for the conduct described in the section, then culpability is not required for a person to be guilty of the offense. The fact that one division of a section plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict liability for an offense defined in that division does not by itself plainly indicate a purpose to impose strict criminal liability for an offense defined in other division of the section that do not specify a degree of culpability.
(c) (1) When language defining an element of an offense that is related to knowledge or intent or to which mens rea could fairly be applied neither specifies culpability nor plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict liability, the element of the offense is established only if a person acts recklessly.
(2) Division (c)(1) of this section does not apply to offenses defined in ORC Title XLV.
(3) Division (c)(1) of this section does not relieve the prosecution of the burden of proving the culpable mental state required by any definition incorporated into the offense.
(d) Voluntary intoxication may not be taken into consideration in determining the existence of a mental state that is an element of a criminal offense. Voluntary intoxication does not relieve a person of a duty to act if failure to act constitutes a criminal offense. Evidence that a person was voluntarily intoxicated may be admissible to show whether or not the person was physically capable of performing the act with which the person is charged.
Statutory reference: ORC 2901.21
(Ord. 2019-22. Passed 11/26/19)
(a) A person acts purposely when it is the person's specific intention to cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain nature, regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is the offender's specific intention to engage in conduct of that nature.
(b) A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the person's conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that such circumstances probably exist. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person subjectively believes that there is a high probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.
(c) A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the person's conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain nature. A person is reckless with respect to circumstances when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such circumstances are likely to exist.
(d) A person acts negligently when, because of a substantial lapse from due care, the person fails to perceive or avoid a risk that the person's conduct may cause a certain result or may be of a certain nature. A person is negligent with respect to circumstances when, because of a substantial lapse from due care, the person fails to perceive or avoid a risk that such circumstances may exist.
(e) When the section defining an offense provides that negligence suffices to establish an element thereof, then recklessness, knowledge, or purpose is also sufficient culpability for such element. When recklessness suffices to establish an element of an offense, then knowledge or purpose is also sufficient culpability for such element. When knowledge suffices to establish an element of an offense, then purpose is also sufficient culpability for such element.
(ORC 2901.22)
(a) An organization may be convicted of an offense under any of the following circumstances:
(1) The offense is a minor misdemeanor committed by an officer, agent or employee of the organization acting in its behalf and within the scope of the officer's, agent's, or employee's office or employment, except that if the section defining the offense designates the officers, agents, or employees for whose conduct the organization is accountable or the circumstances under which it is accountable, those provisions shall apply.
(2) A purpose to impose organizational liability plainly appears in the section defining the offense, and the offense is committed by an officer, agent or employee of the organization acting in its behalf and within the scope of the officer's, agent's, or employee's office or employment, except that if the section defining the offense designates the officers, agents or employees for whose conduct the organization is accountable or the circumstances under which it is accountable, those provisions shall apply.
(3) The offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty imposed by law on the organization.
(4) If, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the offense, its commission was authorized, requested, commanded, tolerated or performed by the board of directors, trustees, partners or by a high managerial officer, agent, or employee acting in behalf of the organization and within the scope of such a board's or person's office or employment.
(b) If strict liability is imposed for the commission of an offense, a purpose to impose organizational liability shall be presumed, unless the contrary plainly appears.
(c) In a prosecution of an organization for an offense other than one for which strict liability is imposed, it is a defense that the high managerial officer, agent, or employee having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the offense exercised due diligence to prevent its commission. This defense is not available if it plainly appears inconsistent with the purpose of the section defining the offense.
(d) As used in this section, "organization" means a corporation for profit or not for profit, partnership, limited partnership, joint venture, unincorporated nonprofit association, estate, trust, or other commercial or legal entity. "Organization" does not include an entity organized as or by a governmental agency for the execution of a governmental program.
(ORC 2901.23)
(a) An officer, agent, or employee of an organization, as defined in ORC 2901.23, may be prosecuted for an offense committed by such organization, if he or she acts with the kind of culpability required for the commission of the offense, and any of the following apply:
(1) In the name of the organization or in its behalf, he or she engages in conduct constituting the offense, or causes another to engage in such conduct, or tolerates such conduct when it is of a type for which he or she has direct responsibility; or
(2) He or she has primary responsibility to discharge a duty imposed on the organization by law, and such duty is not discharged.
(b) When a person is convicted of an offense by reason of this section, he or she is subject to the same penalty as if he or she had acted in his or her own behalf.
(ORC 2901.24)
(a) No person, purposely or knowingly, and when purpose or knowledge is sufficient culpability for the commission of an offense, shall engage in conduct that, if successful, would constitute or result in the offense.
(b) It is no defense to a charge under this section that, in retrospect, commission of the offense that was the object of the attempt was either factually or legally impossible under the attendant circumstances, if that offense could have been committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed them to be.
(c) No person who is convicted of committing a specific offense, of complicity in the commission of an offense, or of conspiracy to commit an offense, shall be convicted of an attempt to commit the same offense in violation of this section.
(d) It is an affirmative defense to a charge under this section that the actor abandoned his or her effort to commit the offense or otherwise prevented its commission, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his or her criminal purpose.
(e) Whoever violates this section is guilty of an attempt to commit an offense. An attempt to commit a drug abuse offense for which the penalty is determined by the amount or number of unit doses of the controlled substance involved in the drug abuse offense is an offense of the same degree as the drug abuse offense attempted would be if that drug abuse offense had been committed and had involved an amount or number of unit doses of the controlled substance that is within the next lower range of controlled substance amounts than was involved in the attempt. An attempt to commit any other offense is an offense of the next lesser degree than the offense attempted. In the case of an attempt to commit an offense other than a violation of ORC Chapter 3734 or a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance that is not specifically classified, an attempt is a misdemeanor of the first degree if the offense attempted is a felony, and a misdemeanor of the fourth degree if the offense attempted is a misdemeanor. An attempt to commit a minor misdemeanor, or to engage in conspiracy, is not an offense under this section.
(f) As used in this section:
(1) "Drug abuse offense" has the same meaning as in ORC 2925.01.
(2) "Motor vehicle" has the same meaning as in ORC 4501.01.
(ORC 2923.02)
(a) No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall do any of the following:
(1) Solicit or procure another to commit the offense;
(2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense;
(3) Conspire with another to commit the offense in violation of ORC 2923.01 or a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance; or
(4) Cause an innocent or irresponsible person to commit the offense.
(b) It is no defense to a charge under this section that no person with whom the accused was in complicity has been convicted as a principal offender.
(c) No person shall be convicted of complicity under this section unless an offense is actually committed, but a person may be convicted of complicity in an attempt to commit an offense in violation of ORC 2923.02 or a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance.
(d) If an alleged accomplice of the defendant testifies against the defendant in a case in which the defendant is charged with complicity in the commission of or an attempt to commit an offense, an attempt to commit an offense, or an offense, the court shall charge the jury in accordance with ORC 2923.03(D).
(e) It is an affirmative defense to a charge under this section that, prior to the commission of or attempt to commit the offense, the actor terminated his or her complicity, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his or her criminal purpose.
(f) Whoever violates this section is guilty of complicity in the commission of an offense and shall be prosecuted and punished as if he or she were a principal offender. A charge of complicity may be stated in terms of this section, or in terms of the principal offense.
(ORC 2923.03)
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