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(a) A person acts purposely when it is the person's specific intention to cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain nature, regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is the offender's specific intention to engage in conduct of that nature.
(b) A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the person's conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that such circumstances probably exist. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person subjectively believes that there is a high probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.
(c) A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the person's conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain nature. A person is reckless with respect to circumstances when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such circumstances are likely to exist.
(d) A person acts negligently when, because of a substantial lapse from due care, the person fails to perceive or avoid a risk that the person's conduct may cause a certain result or may be of a certain nature. A person is negligent with respect to circumstances when, because of a substantial lapse from due care, the person fails to perceive or avoid a risk that such circumstances may exist.
(e) When the section defining an offense provides that negligence suffices to establish an element thereof, then recklessness, knowledge, or purpose is also sufficient culpability for such element. When recklessness suffices to establish an element of an offense, then knowledge or purpose is also sufficient culpability for such element. When knowledge suffices to establish an element of an offense, then purpose is also sufficient culpability for such element.
(ORC 2901.22)
(a) An organization may be convicted of an offense under any of the following circumstances:
(1) The offense is a minor misdemeanor committed by an officer, agent or employee of the organization acting in its behalf and within the scope of the officer's, agent's, or employee's office or employment, except that if the section defining the offense designates the officers, agents, or employees for whose conduct the organization is accountable or the circumstances under which it is accountable, those provisions shall apply.
(2) A purpose to impose organizational liability plainly appears in the section defining the offense, and the offense is committed by an officer, agent or employee of the organization acting in its behalf and within the scope of the officer's, agent's, or employee's office or employment, except that if the section defining the offense designates the officers, agents or employees for whose conduct the organization is accountable or the circumstances under which it is accountable, those provisions shall apply.
(3) The offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty imposed by law on the organization.
(4) If, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the offense, its commission was authorized, requested, commanded, tolerated or performed by the board of directors, trustees, partners or by a high managerial officer, agent, or employee acting in behalf of the organization and within the scope of such a board's or person's office or employment.
(b) If strict liability is imposed for the commission of an offense, a purpose to impose organizational liability shall be presumed, unless the contrary plainly appears.
(c) In a prosecution of an organization for an offense other than one for which strict liability is imposed, it is a defense that the high managerial officer, agent, or employee having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the offense exercised due diligence to prevent its commission. This defense is not available if it plainly appears inconsistent with the purpose of the section defining the offense.
(d) As used in this section, "organization" means a corporation for profit or not for profit, partnership, limited partnership, joint venture, unincorporated nonprofit association, estate, trust, or other commercial or legal entity. "Organization" does not include an entity organized as or by a governmental agency for the execution of a governmental program.
(ORC 2901.23)
(a) An officer, agent, or employee of an organization, as defined in ORC 2901.23, may be prosecuted for an offense committed by such organization, if he or she acts with the kind of culpability required for the commission of the offense, and any of the following apply:
(1) In the name of the organization or in its behalf, he or she engages in conduct constituting the offense, or causes another to engage in such conduct, or tolerates such conduct when it is of a type for which he or she has direct responsibility; or
(2) He or she has primary responsibility to discharge a duty imposed on the organization by law, and such duty is not discharged.
(b) When a person is convicted of an offense by reason of this section, he or she is subject to the same penalty as if he or she had acted in his or her own behalf.
(ORC 2901.24)
(a) No person, purposely or knowingly, and when purpose or knowledge is sufficient culpability for the commission of an offense, shall engage in conduct that, if successful, would constitute or result in the offense.
(b) It is no defense to a charge under this section that, in retrospect, commission of the offense that was the object of the attempt was either factually or legally impossible under the attendant circumstances, if that offense could have been committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed them to be.
(c) No person who is convicted of committing a specific offense, of complicity in the commission of an offense, or of conspiracy to commit an offense, shall be convicted of an attempt to commit the same offense in violation of this section.
(d) It is an affirmative defense to a charge under this section that the actor abandoned his or her effort to commit the offense or otherwise prevented its commission, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his or her criminal purpose.
(e) Whoever violates this section is guilty of an attempt to commit an offense. An attempt to commit a drug abuse offense for which the penalty is determined by the amount or number of unit doses of the controlled substance involved in the drug abuse offense is an offense of the same degree as the drug abuse offense attempted would be if that drug abuse offense had been committed and had involved an amount or number of unit doses of the controlled substance that is within the next lower range of controlled substance amounts than was involved in the attempt. An attempt to commit any other offense is an offense of the next lesser degree than the offense attempted. In the case of an attempt to commit an offense other than a violation of ORC Chapter 3734 or a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance that is not specifically classified, an attempt is a misdemeanor of the first degree if the offense attempted is a felony, and a misdemeanor of the fourth degree if the offense attempted is a misdemeanor. An attempt to commit a minor misdemeanor, or to engage in conspiracy, is not an offense under this section.
(f) As used in this section:
(1) "Drug abuse offense" has the same meaning as in ORC 2925.01.
(2) "Motor vehicle" has the same meaning as in ORC 4501.01.
(ORC 2923.02)
(a) No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall do any of the following:
(1) Solicit or procure another to commit the offense;
(2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense;
(3) Conspire with another to commit the offense in violation of ORC 2923.01 or a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance; or
(4) Cause an innocent or irresponsible person to commit the offense.
(b) It is no defense to a charge under this section that no person with whom the accused was in complicity has been convicted as a principal offender.
(c) No person shall be convicted of complicity under this section unless an offense is actually committed, but a person may be convicted of complicity in an attempt to commit an offense in violation of ORC 2923.02 or a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance.
(d) If an alleged accomplice of the defendant testifies against the defendant in a case in which the defendant is charged with complicity in the commission of or an attempt to commit an offense, an attempt to commit an offense, or an offense, the court shall charge the jury in accordance with ORC 2923.03(D).
(e) It is an affirmative defense to a charge under this section that, prior to the commission of or attempt to commit the offense, the actor terminated his or her complicity, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his or her criminal purpose.
(f) Whoever violates this section is guilty of complicity in the commission of an offense and shall be prosecuted and punished as if he or she were a principal offender. A charge of complicity may be stated in terms of this section, or in terms of the principal offense.
(ORC 2923.03)
(a) As used in this section, "residence" and "vehicle' have the same meanings as in ORC 2901.05.
(b) For the purposes of any section of this General Offenses Code that sets forth a criminal offense, a person who lawfully is in that person's residence has no duty to retreat before using force in self defense, defense of another, or defense of that person's residence, and a person who lawfully is an occupant of that person's vehicle or who lawfully is an occupant in a vehicle owned by an immediate family member of the person has no duty to retreat before using force in self defense or defense of another.
(ORC 2901.09)