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§ 606.07 REQUIREMENTS FOR CRIMINAL LIABILITY; VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION.
   (a)   Except as provided in division (b) of this section, a person is not guilty of an offense unless both of the following apply:
      (1)   he person's liability is based on conduct that includes either a voluntary act, or an omission to perform an act or duty that the person is capable of performing; and
      (2)   The person has the requisite degree of culpability for each element as to which a culpable mental state is specified by the language defining the offense.
   (b)   When the language defining an offense does not specify any degree of culpability, and plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict criminal liability for the conduct described in the section, then culpability is not required for a person to be guilty of the offense. The fact that one division of a section plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict liability for an offense defined in that division does not by itself plainly indicate a purpose to impose strict criminal liability for an offense defined in other division of the section that do not specify a degree of culpability.
   (c)   (1)   When language defining an element of an offense that is related to knowledge or intent or to which mens rea could fairly be applied neither specifies culpability nor plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict liability, the element of the offense is established only if a person acts recklessly.
      (2)   Division (c)(1) of this section does not apply to offenses defined in ORC Title XLV.
      (3)   Division (c)(1) of this section does not relieve the prosecution of the burden of proving the culpable mental state required by any definition incorporated into the offense.
   (d)   Voluntary intoxication may not be taken into consideration in determining the existence of a mental state that is an element of a criminal offense. Voluntary intoxication does not relieve a person of a duty to act if failure to act constitutes a criminal offense. Evidence that a person was voluntarily intoxicated may be admissible to show whether or not the person was physically capable of performing the act with which the person is charged.
Statutory reference: ORC 2901.21
(Ord. 2019-22. Passed 11/26/19)
§ 606.08 CULPABLE MENTAL STATES.
   (a)   A person acts purposely when it is the person's specific intention to cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain nature, regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is the offender's specific intention to engage in conduct of that nature.
   (b)   A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the person's conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that such circumstances probably exist. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person subjectively believes that there is a high probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.
   (c)   A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the person's conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain nature. A person is reckless with respect to circumstances when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such circumstances are likely to exist.
   (d)   A person acts negligently when, because of a substantial lapse from due care, the person fails to perceive or avoid a risk that the person's conduct may cause a certain result or may be of a certain nature. A person is negligent with respect to circumstances when, because of a substantial lapse from due care, the person fails to perceive or avoid a risk that such circumstances may exist.
   (e)   When the section defining an offense provides that negligence suffices to establish an element thereof, then recklessness, knowledge, or purpose is also sufficient culpability for such element. When recklessness suffices to establish an element of an offense, then knowledge or purpose is also sufficient culpability for such element. When knowledge suffices to establish an element of an offense, then purpose is also sufficient culpability for such element.
(ORC 2901.22)
§ 606.09 ORGANIZATIONAL LIABILITY.
   (a)   An organization may be convicted of an offense under any of the following circumstances:
      (1)   The offense is a minor misdemeanor committed by an officer, agent or employee of the organization acting in its behalf and within the scope of the officer's, agent's, or employee's office or employment, except that if the section defining the offense designates the officers, agents, or employees for whose conduct the organization is accountable or the circumstances under which it is accountable, those provisions shall apply.
      (2)   A purpose to impose organizational liability plainly appears in the section defining the offense, and the offense is committed by an officer, agent or employee of the organization acting in its behalf and within the scope of the officer's, agent's, or employee's office or employment, except that if the section defining the offense designates the officers, agents or employees for whose conduct the organization is accountable or the circumstances under which it is accountable, those provisions shall apply.
      (3)   The offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty imposed by law on the organization.
      (4)   If, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the offense, its commission was authorized, requested, commanded, tolerated or performed by the board of directors, trustees, partners or by a high managerial officer, agent, or employee acting in behalf of the organization and within the scope of such a board's or person's office or employment.
   (b)   If strict liability is imposed for the commission of an offense, a purpose to impose organizational liability shall be presumed, unless the contrary plainly appears.
   (c)   In a prosecution of an organization for an offense other than one for which strict liability is imposed, it is a defense that the high managerial officer, agent, or employee having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the offense exercised due diligence to prevent its commission. This defense is not available if it plainly appears inconsistent with the purpose of the section defining the offense.
   (d)   As used in this section, "organization" means a corporation for profit or not for profit, partnership, limited partnership, joint venture, unincorporated nonprofit association, estate, trust, or other commercial or legal entity. "Organization" does not include an entity organized as or by a governmental agency for the execution of a governmental program.
(ORC 2901.23)
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