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501.07 REQUIREMENTS FOR CRIMINAL LIABILITY; VOLUNTARY INTOXICATION.
   (a)   Except as provided in division (b) of this section, a person is not guilty of an offense unless both of the following apply:
      (1)   The person's liability is based on conduct that includes either a voluntary act, or an omission to perform an act or duty that the person is capable of performing;
      (2)   The person has the requisite degree of culpability for each element as to which a culpable mental state is specified by the language defining the offense.
   (b)   When the language defining an offense does not specify any degree of culpability, and plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict criminal liability for the conduct described in the section, then culpability is not required for a person to be guilty of the offense. The fact that one division of a section plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict liability for an offense defined in that division does not by itself plainly indicate a purpose to impose strict criminal liability for an offense defined in other divisions of the section that do not specify a degree of culpability.
   (c)   (1)   When language defining an element of an offense that is related to knowledge or intent or to which mens rea could fairly be applied neither specifies culpability nor plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict liability, the element of the offense is established only if a person acts recklessly.
      (2)   Division (c)(1) of this section does not apply to offenses defined in R.C. Title XLV.
      (3)   Division (c)(1) of this section does not relieve the prosecution of the burden of proving the culpable mental state required by any definition incorporated into the offense.
   (d)   Voluntary intoxication may not be taken into consideration in determining the existence of a mental state that is an element of a criminal offense. Voluntary intoxication does not relieve a person of a duty to act if failure to act constitutes a criminal offense. Evidence that a person was voluntarily intoxicated may be admissible to show whether or not the person was physically capable of performing the act with which the person is charged.
   (e)   As used in this section:
      (1)   "Culpability." Purpose, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence, as defined in Ohio R.C. 2901.22.
      (2)   "Intoxication." Includes but is not limited to intoxication resulting from the ingestion of alcohol, a drug, or alcohol and a drug.
      (3)   "Involuntary acts." Reflexes, convulsions, body movements during unconsciousness or sleep, and body movements that are not otherwise a product of the actor's volition are involuntary acts.
      (4)   "Possession." A voluntary act if the possessor knowingly procured or received the thing possessed, or was aware of the possessor’s control of the thing possessed for a sufficient time to have ended possession.
(ORC 2901.21)
501.08 CULPABLE MENTAL STATES.
   (a)   A person acts purposely when it is the person’s specific intention to cause a certain result, or, when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain nature, regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is the offender’s specific intention to engage in conduct of that nature.
   (b)   A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that such circumstances probably exist. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person subjectively believes that there is a high probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.
   (c)   A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the person’s conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain nature. A person is reckless with respect to circumstances when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, the person disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such circumstances are likely to exist.
   (d)   A person acts negligently when, because of a substantial lapse from due care, the person fails to perceive or avoid a risk that the person’s conduct may cause a certain result or may be of a certain nature. A person is negligent with respect to circumstances when, because of a substantial lapse from due care, the person fails to perceive or avoid a risk that such circumstances may exist.
   (e)   When the section defining an offense provides that negligence suffices to establish an element thereof, then recklessness, knowledge, or purpose is also sufficient culpability for such element. When recklessness suffices to establish an element of an offense, then knowledge or purpose is also sufficient culpability for such element. When knowledge suffices to establish an element of an offense, then purpose is also sufficient culpability for such element.
(ORC 2901.22)
501.09 ATTEMPTS.
   (a)   No person, purposely or knowingly, and when purpose or knowledge is sufficient culpability for the commission of an offense, shall engage in conduct that, if successful, would constitute or result in the offense.
   (b)   It is no defense to a charge under this section that, in retrospect, commission of the offense that was the object of the attempt was either factually or legally impossible under the attendant circumstances, if that offense could have been committed had the attendant circumstances been as the actor believed them to be.
   (c)   No person who is convicted of committing a specific offense, of complicity in the commission of an offense, or of conspiracy to commit an offense, shall be convicted of an attempt to commit the same offense in violation of this section.
   (d)   It is an affirmative defense to a charge under this section that the actor abandoned his or her effort to commit the offense or otherwise prevented its commission, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his or her criminal purpose.
   (e)   Whoever violates this section is guilty of an attempt to commit an offense. An attempt to commit aggravated murder, murder, or an offense for which the maximum penalty is imprisonment for life is a felony of the first degree, to be prosecuted under appropriate State law. An attempt to commit a drug abuse offense for which the penalty is determined by the amount or number of unit doses of the controlled substance involved in the drug abuse offense is an offense of the same degree as the drug abuse offense attempted would be if that drug abuse offense had been committed and had involved an amount or number of unit doses of the controlled substance that is within the next lower range of controlled substance amounts than was involved in the attempt. An attempt to commit any other offense is an offense of the next lesser degree than the offense attempted. In the case of an attempt to commit an offense other than a violation of Ohio R.C. Chapter 3734 that is not specifically classified, an attempt is a misdemeanor of the first degree if the offense attempted is a felony, and a misdemeanor of the fourth degree if the offense attempted is a misdemeanor. In the case of an attempt to commit a violation of any provision of Ohio R.C. Chapter 3734, other than Ohio R.C. 3734.18, that relates to hazardous wastes, an attempt is a felony to be prosecuted under appropriate State law. An attempt to commit a minor misdemeanor, or to engage in conspiracy, is not an offense under this section.
   (f)   As used in this section:
      (1)   “Drug abuse offense” has the same meaning as in Ohio R.C. 2925.01.
      (2)   “Motor vehicle” has the same meaning as in Ohio R.C. 4501.01.
(ORC 2923.02)
501.10 COMPLICITY.
   (a)   No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall do any of the following:
      (1)   Solicit or procure another to commit the offense;
      (2)   Aid or abet another in committing the offense;
      (3)   Conspire with another to commit the offense in violation of Ohio R.C. 2923.01;
      (4)   Cause an innocent or irresponsible person to commit the offense.
   (b)   It is no defense to a charge under this section that no person with whom the accused was in complicity has been convicted as a principal offender.
   (c)   No person shall be convicted of complicity under this section unless an offense is actually committed, but a person may be convicted of complicity in an attempt to commit an offense in violation of Ohio R.C. 2923.02 or a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance.
   (d)   If an alleged accomplice of the defendant testifies against the defendant in a case in which the defendant is charged with complicity in the commission of or an attempt to commit an offense, an attempt to commit an offense, or an offense, the court shall charge the jury in accordance with Ohio R.C. 2923.03(D).
   (e)   It is an affirmative defense to a charge under this section that, prior to the commission of or attempt to commit the offense, the actor terminated his or her complicity, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his or her criminal purpose.
   (f)   Whoever violates this section is guilty of complicity in the commission of an offense, and shall be prosecuted and punished as if he or she were a principal offender. A charge of complicity may be stated in terms of this section, or in terms of the principal offense.
(ORC 2923.03)
501.11 ORGANIZATIONAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY.
   (a)   An organization may be convicted of an offense under any of the following circumstances:
      (1)   The offense is a minor misdemeanor committed by an officer, agent, or employee of the organization acting in its behalf and within the scope of the officer's, agent's, or employee's office or employment, except that if the section defining the offense designates the officers, agents, or employees for whose conduct the organization is accountable or the circumstances under which it is accountable, those provisions shall apply.
      (2)   A purpose to impose organizational liability plainly appears in the section defining the offense, and the offense is committed by an officer, agent, or employee of the organization acting in its behalf and within the scope of the officer's, agent's, or employee's office or employment, except that if the section defining the offense designates the officers, agents, or employees for whose conduct the organization is accountable or the circumstances under which it is accountable, those provisions shall apply.
      (3)   The offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty imposed by law on the organization.
      (4)   If, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the offense, its commission was authorized, requested, commanded, tolerated, or performed by the board of directors, trustees, partners, or by a high managerial officer, agent, or employee acting in behalf of the organization and within the scope of such a board's or person's office or employment.
   (b)   If strict liability is imposed for the commission of an offense, a purpose to impose organizational liability shall be presumed, unless the contrary plainly appears.
   (c)   In a prosecution of an organization for an offense other than one for which strict liability is imposed, it is a defense that the high managerial officer, agent, or employee having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the offense exercised due diligence to prevent its commission. This defense is not available if it plainly appears inconsistent with the purpose of the section defining the offense.
   (d)   As used in this section, “organization” means a corporation for profit or not for profit, partnership, limited partnership, joint venture, unincorporated nonprofit association, estate, trust, or other commercial or legal entity. “Organization” does not include an entity organized as or by a governmental agency for the execution of a governmental program.
(ORC 2901.23)
501.12 PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ORGANIZATIONAL CONDUCT.
   (a)   An officer, agent, or employee of an organization, as defined in Ohio R.C. 2901.23, may be prosecuted for an offense committed by such organization, if he or she acts with the kind of culpability required for the commission of the offense, and any of the following apply:
      (1)   In the name of the organization or in its behalf, he or she engages in conduct constituting the offense, or causes another to engage in such conduct, or tolerates such conduct when it is of a type for which he or she has direct responsibility;
      (2)   He or she has primary responsibility to discharge a duty imposed on the organization by law, and such duty is not discharged.
   (b)   When a person is convicted of an offense by reason of this section, he or she is subject to the same penalty as if he or she had acted in his or her own behalf.
(ORC 2901.24)
501.13 SELF-DEFENSE; LIMITATIONS ON DUTY TO RETREAT PRIOR TO USING FORCE.
   (a)   As used in this section, “residence” has the same meaning as in R.C. § 2901.05.
   (b)   For purposes of any section of this code that sets forth a criminal offense, a person has no duty to retreat before using force in self-defense, defense of another, or defense of that person’s residence if that person is in a place in which the person lawfully has a right to be.
   (c)   A trier of fact shall not consider the possibility of retreat as a factor in determining whether or not a person who used force in self-defense, defense of another, or defense of that person’s residence reasonably believed that the force was necessary to prevent injury, loss, or risk to life or safety.
(R.C. § 2901.09)
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