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(a) Except as provided in division (b) of this section, a person is not guilty of an offense unless both of the following apply:
(1) The person’s liability is based on conduct that includes either a voluntary act, or an omission to perform an act or duty that the person is capable of performing;
(2) The person has the requisite degree of culpability for each element as to which a culpable mental state is specified by the language defining the offense.
(b) When the language defining an offense does not specify any degree of culpability, and plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict criminal liability for the conduct described in the section, then culpability is not required for a person to be guilty of the offense. The fact that one division of a section plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict liability for an offense defined in that division does not by itself plainly indicate a purpose to impose strict criminal liability for an offense defined in other divisions of the section that do not specify a degree of culpability.
(c) (1) When language defining an element of an offense that is related to knowledge or intent or to which mens rea could fairly be applied neither specifies culpability nor plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict liability, the element of the offense is established only if a person acts recklessly.
(2) Division (c)(1) of this section does not apply to offenses defined in R.C. Title XLV.
(3) Division (c)(1) of this section does not relieve the prosecution of the burden of proving the culpable mental state required by any definition incorporated into the offense.
(d) Voluntary intoxication may not be taken into consideration in determining the existence of a mental state that is an element of a criminal offense. Voluntary intoxication does not relieve a person of a duty to act if failure to act constitutes a criminal offense. Evidence that a person was voluntarily intoxicated may be admissible to show whether or not the person was physically capable of performing the act with which the person is charged.
(e) For the purpose of this section, the following definitions shall apply unless the context clearly indicates or requires a different meaning.
(1) CULPABILITY. Purpose, knowledge, recklessness or negligence, as defined in R.C. § 2901.22.
(2) INTOXICATION. Includes but is not limited to intoxication resulting from the ingestion of alcohol, a drug, or alcohol and a drug.
(3) INVOLUNTARY ACTS. Reflexes, convulsions, body movements during unconsciousness or sleep, and body movements that are not otherwise a product of the actor’s volition are “involuntary acts.”
(4) POSSESSION. A voluntary act if the possessor knowingly procured or received the thing possessed, or was aware of the possessor’s control of
the thing possessed for a sufficient time to have ended possession.
(R.C. § 2901.21)
(a) An organization may be convicted of an offense under any of the following circumstances:
(1) The offense is a minor misdemeanor committed by an officer, agent or employee of the organization acting in its behalf and within the scope of the officer’s, agent’s, or employee’s office or employment, except that if the section defining the offense designates the officers, agents or employees for whose conduct the organization is accountable or the circumstances under which it is accountable, those provisions shall apply.
(2) A purpose to impose organizational liability plainly appears in the section defining the offense, and the offense is committed by an officer, agent or employee of the organization acting in its behalf and within the scope of the officer’s, agent’s, or employee’s office or employment, except that if the section defining the offense designates the officers, agents or employees for whose conduct the organization is accountable or the circumstances under which it is accountable, those provisions shall apply.
(3) The offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty imposed by law on the organization.
(4) If, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the offense, its commission was authorized, requested, commanded, tolerated or performed by the board of directors, trustees, partners, or by a high managerial officer, agent or employee acting in behalf of the organization and within the scope of such a board’s or person’s office or employment.
(b) If strict liability is imposed for the commission of an offense, a purpose to impose organizational liability shall be presumed, unless the contrary plainly appears.
(c) In a prosecution of an organization for an offense other than one for which strict liability is imposed, it is a defense that the high managerial officer, agent or employee having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the offense exercised due diligence to prevent its commission. This defense is not available if it plainly appears inconsistent with the purpose of the section defining the offense.
(d) As used in this section,
ORGANIZATION means a corporation for profit or not for profit, partnership, limited partnership, joint venture, unincorporated nonprofit association, estate, trust or other commercial or legal entity. ORGANIZATION does not include an entity organized as or by a governmental agency for the execution of a governmental program.
(ORC 2901.23)
(a) An officer, agent, or employee of an organization, as defined in Ohio R.C. 2901.23, may be prosecuted for an offense committed by such organization, if he or she acts with the kind of culpability required for the commission of the offense, and any of the following apply:
(1) In the name of the organization or in its behalf, he or she engages in conduct constituting the offense, or causes another to engage in such conduct, or tolerates such conduct when it is of a type for which he or she has direct responsibility;
(2) He or she has primary responsibility to discharge a duty imposed on the organization by law, and such duty is not discharged.
(b) When a person is convicted of an offense by reason of this section, he or she is subject to the same penalty as if he or she had acted in his or her own behalf.
(ORC 2901.24)
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