(a) Attempt. A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime, (s)he:
(1) Purposely engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if the attendant circumstances were as a reasonable person would believe them to be;
(2) When causing a particular result is an element of the crime, does or omits to do anything with the purpose of causing such result without further conduct on his/her part; or
(3) Purposely does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as a reasonable person would believe them to be, is an act or omission constituting a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his/her commission of the crime.
(b) “Conduct” Which may be Held a Substantial Step Under Subsection (a)(3). Conduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial step under subsection (a)(3) of this section unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor’s criminal purpose.
(c) “Conduct” Designed to Aid Another in Commission of a Crime. A person who engages in conduct designed to aid another to commit a crime which would establish his/her complicity if the crime were committed by such other person is guilty of an attempt to commit the crime.
(d) Renunciation of Criminal Purpose.
(1) When the actor’s conduct would otherwise constitute an attempt under subsection (a)(2) or (a)(3) of this section, it is an affirmative defense which (s)he must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that (s)he abandoned his/her efforts to commit the crime or otherwise prevented its commission, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his/her criminal purpose. The establishment of such defense does not, however, affect the liability of an accomplice who did not join in such abandonment or preventions.
(2) Within the meaning of this article, renunciation of criminal purpose is not voluntary if it is motivated, in whole or in part, by circumstances, not present or apparent at the inception of the actor’s course of conduct, which increase the probability of detection or apprehension or which make more difficult the accomplishment of the criminal purpose. Renunciation is not complete if it is motivated by a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until a more advantageous time or to transfer the criminal effort to another but similar objective or victim. Renunciation is also not complete if mere abandonment is insufficient to accomplish avoidance of the offense in which case the actor must have taken further and affirmative steps that prevented the commissions thereof.
(e) Public Place. “Public place” means any place in which the public has access, including but not limited to a public street, road, thoroughfare, sidewalk, bridge, alley, plaza, park, recreation or shopping area, public transportation facility, vehicle used for public transportation, parking lot, public library or any other public building, structure, or area.
(f) Controlled Substance and Deliver/Delivery. The following terms shall have the meanings set forth in W.Va. Code Section 60A-1-101, which code definitions, as may from time to time be amended, are hereby adopted and incorporated herein:
(1) “Controlled Substances” (See West Virginia Code Section 60A-1-101(d)).
(2) “Deliver” or “delivery” (See West Virginia Code Section 60A-1-101(g)).
(Ord. 2000-12. Passed 5-15-00.)