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501.07 REQUIREMENTS FOR CRIMINAL LIABILITY.
   (a)   Except as provided in subsection (b) hereof, a person is not guilty of an offense unless both of the following apply:
      (1)   The person's liability is based on conduct that includes either a voluntary act, or an omission to perform an act or duty that the person is capable of performing;
      (2)   The person has the requisite degree of culpability for each element as to which a culpable mental state is specified by the language defining the offense.
   (b)   When the language defining an offense does not specify any degree of culpability, and plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict criminal liability for the conduct described in the section, then culpability is not required for a person to be guilty of the offense. The fact that one subsection of a section plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict liability for an offense defined in that subsection does not by itself plainly indicate a purpose to impose strict criminal liability for an offense defined in other subsections of the section that do not specify a degree of culpability.
   (c)   (1)   When language defining an element of an offense that is related to knowledge or intent or to which mens rea could fairly be applied neither specifies culpability nor plainly indicates a purpose to impose strict liability, the element of the offense is established only if a person acts recklessly.
      (2)   Subsection (c)(1) of this section does not apply to offenses defined in the Traffic Code.
      (3)   Subsection (c)(1) of this section does not relieve the prosecution of the burden of proving the culpable mental state required by any definition incorporated into the offense.
   (d)   Voluntary intoxication may not be taken into consideration in determining the existence of a mental state that is an element of a criminal offense. Voluntary intoxication does not relieve a person of a duty to act if failure to act constitutes a criminal offense. Evidence that a person was voluntarily intoxicated may be admissible to show whether or not the person was physically capable of performing the act with which the person is charged.
   (e)   As used in this section:
      (1)   Possession is a voluntary act if the possessor knowingly procured or received the thing possessed, or was aware of the possessor's control of the thing possessed for a sufficient time to have ended possession.
      (2)   Reflexes, convulsions, body movements during unconsciousness or sleep, and body movements that are not otherwise a product of the actor's volition, are involuntary acts.
      (3)   "Culpability" means purpose, knowledge, recklessness or negligence, as defined in Section 501.08.
      (4)   "Intoxication" includes, but is not limited to, intoxication resulting from the ingestion of alcohol, a drug, or alcohol and a drug.
         (ORC 2901.21)
501.08 CULPABLE MENTAL STATES.
   (a)   A person acts purposely when it is the person’s specific intention to cause a certain result, or when the gist of the offense is a prohibition against conduct of a certain nature, regardless of what the offender intends to accomplish thereby, it is the offender’s specific intention to engage in conduct of that nature.
   (b)   A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances when the person is aware that such circumstances probably exist.
   When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a person subjectively believes that there is a high probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.
   (c)   A person acts recklessly when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, the person perversely disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the person’s conduct is likely to cause a certain result or is likely to be of a certain nature. A person is reckless with respect to circumstances when, with heedless indifference to the consequences, the person perversely disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such circumstances are likely to exist.
   (d)   A person acts negligently when, because of a substantial lapse from due care, the person fails to perceive or avoid a risk that the person’s conduct may cause a certain result or may be of a certain nature. A person is negligent with respect to circumstances when, because of a substantial lapse from due care, the person fails to perceive or avoid a risk that such circumstances may exist.
   (e)   When the section defining an offense provides that negligence suffices to establish an element thereof, then recklessness, knowledge or purpose is also sufficient culpability for such element. When recklessness suffices to establish an element of an offense, then knowledge or purpose is also sufficient culpability for such element. When knowledge suffices to establish an element of an offense, then purpose is also sufficient culpability for such element.
(ORC 2901.22)
501.09 ATTEMPT.
   (a)   No person, purposely or knowingly, and when purpose or knowledge is sufficient culpability for the commission of an offense, shall engage in conduct that, if successful, would constitute or result in the offense.
 
   (b)   It is no defense to a charge under this section that, in retrospect, commission of the offense that was the object of the attempt was either factually or legally impossible under the circumstances if that offense could have been committed had the circumstances been as the actor believed them.
 
   (c)   No person who is convicted of committing a specific offense or of complicity in the commission of such offense, shall be convicted of an attempt to commit the same offense in violation of this section.
 
   (d)   It is an affirmative defense to a charge under this section that the actor abandoned his or her effort to commit the offense or otherwise prevented its commission, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his or her criminal purpose.
 
   (e)   (1)   Whoever violates this section is guilty of an attempt to commit an offense. An attempt to commit aggravated murder, murder, or an offense for which the maximum penalty is imprisonment for life is a felony of the first degree, to be prosecuted under appropriate state law. An attempt to commit a drug abuse offense for which the penalty is determined by the amount or number of unit doses of the controlled substance involved in the drug abuse offense is an offense of the same degree as the drug abuse offense attempted would be if that drug abuse offense had been committed and had involved an amount or number of unit doses of the controlled substance that is within the next lower range of controlled substance amounts than was involved in the attempt. An attempt to commit any other offense is an offense of the next lesser degree than the offense attempted. In the case of an attempt to commit an offense other than a violation of R.C. Chapter 3734 that is not specifically classified, an attempt is a misdemeanor of the first degree if the offense attempted is a felony, and a misdemeanor of the fourth degree if the offense attempted is a misdemeanor. In the case of an attempt to commit a violation of any provision of R.C. Chapter 3734, other than R.C. § 3734.18, that relates to hazardous wastes, an attempt is a felony to be prosecuted under appropriate state law. An attempt to commit a minor misdemeanor, or to engage in conspiracy, is not an offense under this section.
      (2)   In addition to any other sanctions imposed pursuant to division (e)(1) of this section for an attempt to commit aggravated murder or murder in violation of division (a) of this section, if the offender used a motor vehicle as the means to attempt to commit the offense, the court shall impose upon the offender a class two suspension of the offender’s driver’s license, commercial driver’s license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege as specified in R.C. § 4510.02(A)(2).
      (3)   If a person is convicted of or pleads guilty to attempted rape and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a specification of the type described in R.C. § 2941.1418, 2941.1419, or 2941.1420, the offender shall be sentenced to a prison term or term of life imprisonment pursuant to R.C. § 2971.03.
   (f)   As used in this section:
      (1)   "Drug abuse offense" has the same meaning as in R.C. § 2925.01.
      (2)   "Motor vehicle" has the same meaning as in R.C. § 4501.01.
         (R.C. § 2923.02)
501.10 COMPLICITY.
   (a)   No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the commission of an offense, shall do any of the following:
      (1)   Solicit or procure another to commit the offense;
      (2)   Aid or abet another in committing the offense;
      (3)   Cause an innocent or irresponsible person to commit the offense.
      (4)   Conspire with another to commit the offense.
 
   (b)   It is no defense to a charge under this section that no person with whom the accused was in complicity has been convicted as a principal offender.
 
   (c)   No person shall be convicted of complicity under this section unless an offense is actually committed, but a person may be convicted of complicity in an attempt to commit an offense in violation of § 501.09.
 
   (d)   If an alleged accomplice of the defendant testifies against the defendant in a case in which the defendant is charged with complicity in the commission of or an attempt to commit an offense, an attempt to commit an offense or an offense, the court when it charges the jury, shall state substantially the following:
   "The testimony of an accomplice does not become inadmissible because of his complicity, moral turpitude or self-interest, but the admitted or claimed complicity of a witness may affect his credibility and make his testimony subject to grave suspicion, and require that it be weighed with great caution.
   "It is for you, as jurors, in the light of all the facts presented to you from the witness stand, to evaluate such testimony and to determine its quality and worth or its lack of quality and worth."
 
   (e)   It is an affirmative defense to a charge under this section that, prior to the commission of or attempt to commit the offense, the actor terminated his complicity, under circumstances manifesting a complete and voluntary renunciation of his criminal purpose.
 
   (f)   Whoever violates this section is guilty of complicity in the commission of an offense, and shall be prosecuted and punished as if he were a principal offender. A charge of complicity may be stated in terms of this section, or in terms of the principal offense.
(R.C. § 2923.03)
 
501.11 ORGANIZATIONAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY.
   (a)   An organization may be convicted of an offense under any of the following circumstances:
      (1)   The offense is a minor misdemeanor committed by an officer, agent or employee of the organization acting in its behalf and within the scope of the officer’s, agent’s or employee’s office or employment, except that if the section defining the offense designates the officers, agents or employees for whose conduct the organization is accountable or the circumstances under which it is accountable, those provisions shall apply.
      (2)   A purpose to impose organizational liability plainly appears in the section defining the offense, and the offense is committed by an officer, agent or employee of the organization acting in its behalf and within the scope of the officer’s, agent’s or employee’s office or employment, except that if the section defining the offense designates the officers, agents or employees for whose conduct the organization is accountable or the circumstances under which it is accountable, those provisions shall apply.
      (3)   The offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty imposed by law on the organization.
      (4)   If, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the offense, its commission was authorized, requested, commanded, tolerated or performed by the board of directors, trustees, partners or by a high managerial officer, agent or employee acting in behalf of the organization and within the scope of such a board’s or person’s office or employment.
   (b)   If strict liability is imposed for the commission of an offense, a purpose to impose organizational liability shall be presumed, unless the contrary plainly appears.
   (c)   In a prosecution of an organization for an offense other than one for which strict liability is imposed, it is a defense that the high managerial officer, agent or employee having supervisory responsibility over the subject matter of the offense exercised due diligence to prevent its commission. This defense is not available if it plainly appears inconsistent with the purpose of the section defining the offense.
   (d)   As used in this section, "organization" means a corporation for profit or not for profit, partnership, limited partnership, joint venture, unincorporated nonprofit association, estate, trust or other commercial or legal entity. "Organization" does not include an entity organized as or by a governmental agency for the execution of a governmental program. (ORC 2901.23)
 
501.12 PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ORGANIZATIONAL CONDUCT.
   (a)   An officer, agent or employee of an organization as defined in § 501.11 may be prosecuted for an offense committed by such organization, if he acts with the kind of culpability required for the commission of the offense, and any of the following apply:
      (1)   In the name of the organization or in its behalf, he engages in conduct constituting the offense, or causes another to engage in such conduct, or tolerates such conduct when it is of a type for which he has direct responsibility;
      (2)   He has primary responsibility to discharge a duty imposed on the organization by law, and such duty is not discharged.
 
   (b)   When a person is convicted of an offense by reason of this section, he is subject to the same penalty as if he had acted in his own behalf.
(R.C. § 2901.24)
 
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