(A) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under § 90.97(A) that the person is a veterinarian, a peace officer, a person employed by a recognized animal services center, or a person employed by the state or a political subdivision of the state to deal with stray animals and has temporary ownership, custody or control of the dog in connection with that position.
(B) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under § 90.97(A) that the person is an employee of the institutional division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice or a law enforcement agency and trains or uses dogs for law enforcement or corrections purposes, and the incident giving rise to such prosecution occurred within the course and scope of such employment.
(C) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under § 90.97(A) that the person is a dog trainer or an employee of a guard dog company under the Private Investigators and Private Security Agencies Act, and is not the actual owner of the dog.
(D) It is a defense to prosecution under § 90.97(A) that the person injured by the dangerous dog was teasing, tormenting, abusing, or assaulting the dog or has been previously reported to the Animal Services Division as having teased, tormented, abused or assaulted the dog.
(E) It is a defense to prosecution under § 90.97(A) that the person injured by the dangerous dog was committing or attempting to commit a crime,
(F) It is a defense to prosecution under § 90.97(A) that the dog was protecting or defending a person from an unjustified attack or assault while in such person's control.
(G) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under § 90.97(C) that the person lawfully owned and harbored the dog in the city on January 19, 2018.
(Ord. 2018-04, passed 1-9-18)