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Sec. 28-193. Severability,
   (1)   Mindful of Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137 (1996), in which in the context of determining the severability of a state statute regulating abortion the United States Supreme Court held that an explicit statement of legislative intent is controlling, it is the intent of the city council that every provision, section, subsection, sentence, clause, phrase, or word in this article, and every application of the provisions in this article, are severable from each other. If any application of any provision in this article to any person, group of persons, or circumstances is found by a court to be invalid or unconstitutional, then the remaining applications of that provision to all other persons and circumstances shall be severed and may not be affected. All constitutionally valid applications of this article shall be severed from any applications that a court finds to be invalid, leaving the valid applications in force, because it is the city council's intent and priority that the valid applications be allowed to stand alone. Even if a reviewing court finds a provision of this article to impose an undue burden in a large or substantial fraction of relevant cases, the applications that do not present an undue burden shall be severed from the remaining provisions and shall remain in force, and shall be treated as if the city council had enacted an ordinance limited to the persons, group of persons, or circumstances for which the statute's application does not present an undue burden. The city council further declares that it would have passed this article, and each provision, section, subsection, sentence, clause, phrase, or word, and all constitutional applications of this article, irrespective of the fact that any provision, section, subsection, sentence, clause, phrase, or word, or applications of this article, were to be declared unconstitutional or to represent an undue burden.
   (2)   If any provision of this article is found by any court to be unconstitutionally vague, then the applications of that provision that do not present constitutional vagueness problems shall be severed and remain in force, consistent with the declarations of the city council's intent in section 28-193(1).
   (3)   No court may decline to enforce the severability requirements in sections 28-193(1) and (2) on the ground that severance would "rewrite" the ordinance or involve the court in legislative activity. A court that declines to enforce or enjoins a city official from enforcing a subset of an ordinance's applications is never "rewriting" an ordinance, as the ordinance continues to say exactly what it said before. A judicial injunction or declaration of unconstitutionality is nothing more than a non-enforcement edict that can always be vacated by later courts if they have a different understanding of what the Constitution requires; it is not a formal amendment of the language in a statute or ordinance. A judicial injunction or declaration of unconstitutionality no more "rewrites" an ordinance than a decision by the executive not to enforce a duly enacted ordinance in a limited and defined set of circumstances.
   (4)   If any federal or state court ignores or declines to enforce the requirements of sections 28-193(1) and (2), or (3), or holds a provision of this article invalid on its face after failing to enforce the severability requirements of sections 28-193(1) and (2), for any reason whatsoever, then the mayor shall hold delegated authority to issue a saving construction of the ordinance that avoids the constitutional problems or other problems identified by the federal or state court, while enforcing the provisions of the ordinance to the maximum possible extent. The saving construction issued by the mayor shall carry the same force of law as an ordinance; it shall represent the authoritative construction of the ordinance in both federal and state judicial proceedings; and it shall remain in effect until the court ruling that declares invalid or enjoins the enforcement of the original provision in the ordinance is overruled, vacated, or reversed.
   (5)   The Mayor must issue the saving construction described in section 28-193(4) within 20 days after a judicial ruling that declares invalid or enjoins the enforcement of a provision of this article after failing to enforce the severability requirements of 28-193(1) and (2). If the mayor fails to issue the saving construction required by 28-193(4) within 20 days after a judicial ruling that declares invalid or enjoins the enforcement of a provision of this article after failing to enforce the severability requirements of sections 28-193(1) or (2), or if the mayor's saving construction fails to enforce the provisions of the ordinance to the maximum possible extent permitted by the Constitution or other superseding legal requirements, as construed by the federal or state judiciaries, then any person may petition for a writ of mandamus requiring the mayor to issue the saving construction described in section 28-193(4).
(Ord. No. 004-2020, 1-28-2020)