(A) A person is guilty of an offense if it is committed by his or her own conduct or by the conduct of another person for which he or she is liable, or both.
(B) A person is liable for the conduct of another person constituting an offense if:
(1) He or she is made liable by the ordinance defining the offense; or
(2) With the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense he or she:
(a) Solicits or commends such other person to commit the offense;
(b) Aids or abets or agrees or attempts to aid or abet such other person in planning or committing the offense; or
(c) Having a legal duty to prevent the commission of the offense, fails to make an effort he or she is legally required to make.
(C) In any prosecution for an offense in which liability is based upon the conduct of another person pursuant to division (B) above, it is no defense that:
(1) Such other person has not been prosecuted for or convicted of any offense based upon the conduct in question or has been convicted of a different offense; or
(2) The offense, as defined, can be committed only by a particular class or classes of persons to which the defendant does not belong, and he or she is for that reason legally incapable of committing the offense in an individual capacity.
(D) Except as otherwise provided by the ordinance defining the offense, a person is not liable for conduct of another constituting an offense if he or she is a victim of that offense or the offense is so defined that his or her conduct is necessarily incidental thereto.
(E) In addition to the liability of a corporation, firm, partnership, association or joint stock company otherwise imposed by the ordinances of this city, such an organization is guilty of an offense if:
(1) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in by an agent of the corporation while acting within the scope of his or her employment and on behalf of the corporation, or the offense is one defined by an ordinance that clearly indicates a legislative intent to impose liability on a corporation;
(2) The conduct constituting the offense consists of an omission to discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on corporations by law; or
(3) The conduct constituting the offense is engaged in, authorized, solicited, requested, commanded or knowingly tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting within the scope of his or her employment and in behalf of the corporation.
(F) A person is liable for conduct constituting an offense which he or she performs or causes to be performed in the name of or in behalf of a corporation, firm, partnership, association or joint stock company to the same extent as if such conduct were performed in his or her own name or behalf.
(G) For the purpose of this section, the following definitions shall apply unless the context clearly indicates or requires a different meaning.
AGENT. Any director, officer or employee of a corporation, or any other person who is authorized to act in behalf of the corporation.
HIGH MANAGERIAL AGENT. An officer of a corporation who exercises authority with respect to the formulation of corporate policy or the supervision in a managerial capacity of subordinate employees, or any other agent in a position of comparable authority.
(Prior Code, § 130.03) (Ord. 259, passed 5-8-1979) Penalty, see § 130.99