§ 142.03 SEVERABILITY.
   (A)   Mindful of Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137 (1996), in which in the context of determining the severability of a state statute regulating abortion the Supreme Court of the United States held that an explicit statement of legislative intent is controlling, it is the intent of the City Council that every provision, section, subsection, sentence, clause, phrase, or word in this chapter, and every
application of the provisions in this chapter to every person, group of persons, or circumstances, are severable from each other.
   (B)   If any application of any provision in this chapter to any person, group of persons, or circumstances is found by any court to be invalid, preempted, or unconstitutional, for any reason whatsoever, then the remaining applications of that provision to all other persons and circumstances shall be severed and preserved, and shall remain in effect. All constitutionally valid applications of the provisions in this chapter shall be severed from any applications that a court finds to be invalid, preempted, or unconstitutional, because it is the City Council’s intent and priority that every single valid application of every provision in this chapter be allowed to stand alone.
   (C)   The City Council further declares that it would have enacted this chapter, and each provision, section, subsection, sentence, clause, phrase, or word, and all constitutional applications of the provisions of this chapter, irrespective of the fact that any provision, section, subsection, sentence, clause, phrase, or word, or applications of this chapter were to be declared invalid, preempted, or unconstitutional.
   (D)   If any provision of this chapter is found by any court to be unconstitutionally vague, then the applications of that provision that do not present constitutional vagueness problems shall be severed and remain in force, consistent with the severability requirements of subsections (A), (B), and (C).
   (E)   No court may decline to enforce the severability requirements of subsections (A), (B), (C), and (D) on the ground that severance would “rewrite” the ordinance or involve the court in legislative or lawmaking activity. A court that declines to enforce or enjoins a state or local official from enforcing a statute or ordinance is never rewriting the underlying law or engaging in legislative or lawmaking activity, as the statute or ordinance continues to contain the same words as before the court’s decision. A judicial injunction or declaration of unconstitutionality:
      (1)   Is nothing more than an edict prohibiting enforcement that may subsequently be vacated by a later court if that court has a different understanding of the requirements of the Illinois Constitution or United States Constitution;
      (2)   Is not a formal amendment of the language in a statute or ordinance; and
      (3)   No more rewrites a statute or ordinance than a decision by the executive not to enforce a duly enacted statute in a limited and defined set of circumstances.
   (F)   If any court, including any state or federal court, disregards any of the severability requirements in subsections (A), (B), (C), (D), or (E), and declares or finds any provision of this chapter facially invalid, preempted, or unconstitutional, when there are discrete applications of that provision can be enforced against a person, group of persons, or circumstances without violating federal or state law or the federal or state constitutions, then that provision shall be interpreted, as a matter of city law, as if the City Council had enacted a provision limited to the persons, group of persons, or circumstances for which the provision’s application will not violate federal or state law or the federal or state constitutions, and every court shall adopt this saving construction of that provision until the court ruling that pronounced the provision facially invalid, preempted, or unconstitutional is vacated or overruled.
(Ord. 9432, passed 5-2-23)