(A) Purpose. It is the purpose of this chapter to regulate sexually oriented businesses in order to promote the health, safety, and general welfare of the citizens of the city, and to establish reasonable and uniform regulations to prevent the deleterious secondary effects of sexually oriented businesses within the city. The provisions of this chapter have neither the purpose nor effect of imposing a limitation or restriction on the content or reasonable access to any communicative materials, including sexually oriented materials. Similarly, it is neither the intent nor effect of this chapter to restrict or deny access by adults to sexually oriented materials protected by the first amendment, or to deny access by the distributors and exhibitors of sexually oriented entertainment to their intended market. Neither is it the intent nor effect of this chapter to condone or legitimize the distribution of obscene material.
(B) Findings and rationale.
(1) Based on evidence of the adverse secondary effects of adult uses presented in hearings and in reports made available to the City Council, and on findings, interpretations, and narrowing constructions incorporated in the cases of City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, 1.1.C., 541 U.S. 774 (2004); City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002); City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976), Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991); California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972); Bellance v. N.Y. State Liquor Authority, 452 U.S. 714 (1981);
(2) Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc. v. Metropolitan Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson County, 466 F.3d 391 (6th Cir. 2006) (Deja Vu III); Commonwealth v. Jameson, 215 S.W.3d 9 (Ky. 2006); 729, Inc. v. Kenton County, 2006 WL 2842884 (E.D. Ky. 2006); Deja Vu of Cincinnati, 1.1. C. v. Union Township Bd. Of Trustees, 411 F.3d 777 (6th Cir. 2005) (en banc); Fantasy Ranch, Inc. v. City of Arlington, 459 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 2006); City of Chicago v. Pooh Bah Enterprises, Inc., 865 N.E.2d 133 (III. 2006); Sensations, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids, 2006 WL 2504388 (W.D. Mich. 2006); Andy’s Restaurant & Lounge, Inc. v. City of Gary, 466 F.3d 550 (7th Cir. 2006); 181 South, Inc. v. Fischer, 454 F.3d 228 (3rd Cir. 2006); Z.J. Gifts D-2, 1.1.C. v. City of Aurora, 136 F.3d 683 (10th Cir. 1998); ILQ Investments, Inc. v. City of Rochester, 25 F.3d 1413 (8th Cir. 1994); Kentucky Restaurant Concepts, Inc. v. City of Louisville, 209 F. Supp. 2d 672 (W. D. Ky. 2002); Restaurant Ventures v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov’t, 60 S.W.3d 572 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001); World Wide Video of Washington, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 368 F.3d 1186 (9th Cir. 2004); Deja Vu of Nashville, Inc., et al v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County, 274 F.3d 377 (6th Cir. 2001); Ben’s Bar, Inc. v. Village of Somerset, 316 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2003); Ctr. for Fair Public Policy v. Maricopa County, 336 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2003); Bigg Wolf Discount Video Sales, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 256 F. Supp. 2d 385 (D. Md. 2003); Kentucky Restaurant Concepts, Inc. v. Metro Gov’t, Case No. 04-CI-01967 (Jefferson Circuit Court, Summary Judgment Order, Dec. 14, 2004); Gammoh v. City of La Habra, 395 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2005); DLS, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga, 107 F.3d 403 (6th Cir. 1997); Brandywine, Inc. v. City of Richmond, 359 F.3d 830 (6th Cir. 2004); Currence v. City of Cincinnati, 28 Fed. Appx. 438 (6th Cir. Jan. 24, 2002); Broadway Books v. Roberts, 642 F. Supp. 486 (E.D. Tenn. 1986); Bright Lights, Inc. v. City of Newport, 830 F. Supp. 378 (E.D. Ky. 1993); Richland Bookmart v. Nichols, 137 F.3d 435 (6th Cir. 1998); In re Tennessee Public Indecency Statute, 172 F.3d 873 (6th Cir. Jan. 13, 1999) (table); Bamon Corp. v. City of Dayton, 923 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1991); Triplett Grille, Inc. v. City of Akron, 40 F.3d 129 (6th Cir. 1994); O’Connor v. City & County of Denver, 894 F.2d 1210 (10th Cir. 1990); Threesome Entertainment v. Strittmather, 4 F. Supp. 2d 710 (N.D. Ohio 1998); Lady J. Lingerie, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 176 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 1999); Williams v. Morgan, 478 F.3d 1316 (11th Cir. 2007); H&A Land Corp. v. City of Kennedale, 480 F.3d 336 (5th Cir. 2007);
(3) Based upon reports concerning secondary effects occurring in and around sexually oriented businesses, including, but not limited to, Austin, Texas - 1986; Indianapolis, Indiana - 1984; Garden Grove, California - 1991; Houston, Texas - 1983, 1997; Phoenix, Arizona - 1979, 1995-1998; Chattanooga, Tennessee - 1999-2003; Los Angeles, California - 1977; Whither, California - 1978; Spokane, Washington - 2001; St. Cloud, Minnesota - 1994; Littleton, Colorado - 2004; Oklahoma City, Oklahoma - 1986; Dallas, Texas - 1997; Kennedale, Texas – 2005; Greensboro, North Carolina - 2003; Amarillo, Texas - 1977; New York, New York Times Square - 1994; the Report of the Attorney General’s Working Group On The Regulation Of Sexually Oriented Businesses, (June 6, 1989, State of Minnesota); and Kenton and Campbell Counties, Kentucky – 2003, 2005; and
(4) The City Council finds the following.
(a) Sexually oriented businesses, as a category of commercial uses, are associated with a wide variety of adverse secondary effects including, but not limited to, personal and property crimes, prostitution, potential spread of disease, lewdness, public indecency, obscenity, illicit drug use and drug trafficking, negative impacts on surrounding properties, urban blight, litter, and sexual assault and exploitation.
(b) Each of the foregoing negative secondary effects constitutes a harm which the city has a substantial government interest in preventing and/or abating. This substantial government interest in preventing secondary effects, which is the city’s rationale for this chapter, exists independent of any comparative analysis between sexually oriented and non-sexually oriented businesses. Additionally, the city’s interest in regulating sexually oriented businesses extends to preventing future secondary effects of either current or future sexually oriented businesses that may locate in the city. The city finds that the cases and documentation relied on in this chapter are reasonably believed to be relevant to said secondary effects.
(Prior Code, § 116.01) (Ord. 2007-10.02, passed 10-15-2007)