(A) Any fine, other sanction, or costs imposed, or part of any fine, other sanction, or costs imposed, remaining unpaid after the exhaustion of, or the failure to exhaust, judicial review procedures under the Illinois Administrative Review Law, is a debt due and owing the city and may be collected in accordance with applicable law.
(B) After expiration of the period in which judicial review under the Illinois Administrative Review Law may be sought for a final determination of a code violation, unless stayed by a court of competent jurisdiction, the findings, decision and order of the Hearing Officer may be enforced in the same manner as a judgment entered by a court of competent jurisdiction.
(C) In any case in which a Hearing Officer finds that a defendant has failed to comply with a judgment ordering a defendant to correct a code violation or imposing any fine or other sanction as a result of a code violation, any expenses incurred by the city to enforce the judgment, including, but not limited to, attorney’s fees, court costs and costs related to property demolition or foreclosure, after they are fixed by the Hearing Officer, shall be a debt due and owing the city and may be collected in accordance with applicable law.
(D) A lien shall be imposed on the real estate or personal estate, or both, of the defendant in the amount of any debt due and owing the city under this section. The lien may be recorded and enforced in the same manner as a judgment lien pursuant to a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction. No lien may be enforced under this section until it has been recorded in the manner provided by Article XII of the Code of Civil Procedure, being ILCS Ch. 735, Act 5, §§ 12-101 et seq., or by the Uniform Commercial Code.
(E) The Hearing Officer may set aside any judgment entered by default and set a new hearing date upon receipt of a petition filed within 21 days after the issuance of the order of default if the Hearing Officer determines that the petitioner’s failure to appear at the hearing was for good cause, or at any time if the petitioner establishes that the city did not provide proper service of process.
(Ord. 97-53, passed 12-9-1997)